73-1578

Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED
APR 22 1974
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1973

No. 73-

FILIPPO IVELI,

Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

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FILIPPO IVELI,

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vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Petitioner respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari be granted to review the order and determination of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rendered the 22nd day of Februry, 1974, affirming without opinion the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, rendered the 9th day of November, 1973, convicting petitioner of violating the narcotics laws of the United States, after trial before Honorable Morris Lasker and a jury.

OPINION BELOW

No opinion was rendered by the United States Court of Appeals.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1). The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction on the 22nd day of February, 1974, and, on the 18th day of March, 1974, Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall extended petitioner's time to file a Writ of Certiorari until April 23, 1974. Copies of the order of the United States Court of Appeals and of Justice Thurgood Marshall's extension of time are annexed hereto as exhibits.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution are involved herein, as well as 18 U.S.C. Sections 2510-2518.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the law permitting wiretapping is constitutional?

2. Whether petitioner's rights to a fair trial were violated by the refusal of the Trial Judge to conduct a minimization hearing as to the wiretapping with respect to "underlying warrants and tapes and taps"?

3. Whether in fact proper minimization of the wiretaps was effectuated in view of the fact that all but 2 of 115 intercepted calls were overheard and recorded despite the fact that later it was determined that many of these calls were not pertinent?

4. Whether it was error to deny petitioner a severance of trial from the co-defendant, Salvatore Larca (who was acquitted), since Larca invoked the Fifth Amendment when petitioner sought to call him as a witness?

5. Whether petitioner's rights to a fair trial were violated by the elicitation from the government witness Fonte that Iveli had communicated a threat to him, in view of the circumstance that no notification of this threat had ever been made prior to the testimony itself, nor had any report appeared among the 3500 material?

THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The factual issues herein are not difficult to comprehend and it is apparent from a perusal of the record that the conviction is predicated upon the testimony of accomplices, namely Frank Fonte, James Johnson, Jr. and Robert Mentrasti. These three accomplices were all admittedly involved in drug dealing and were convicted upon their own pleas of guilty prior to trial.

It is undisputed that substantial electronic surveillance was conducted by various state law enforcement authorities, the products of which were turned over on a "silver platter" to the federal government. Appropriate motions to suppress were made as well as a request for a minimization hearing. The Court denied a meaningful minimization hearing on the apparent grounds that the petition lacked standing, although it is obvious that the federal government must have obtained the leads relating to Iveli, as well as information, from these wiretaps. As a matter of fact, Iveli was the direct subject of several of the wiretap orders which were obtained.

Since this appeal if proceeding *in forma pauperis*, we would ask this Court to review the original exhibits of those wiretap orders indicating that Iveli was the subject of telephonic interceptions by wiretap.

Additionally, the petitioner was tried along with several other co-defendants. Motions for severance were made but denied, despite the fact that Iveli indicated that he necessarily would be prejudiced unless he could call Salvatore Larca, a co-defendant who was acquitted at the trial, as a witness in his behalf.

The use of the testimony of accomplices is fraught with dangers not ordinarily involved in cases where disinterested witnesses are used by the prosecution. In this context, the testimony of Frank Fonte, one of the main witnesses of the prosecution, was most damaging and most prejudicial. The reason for this is that Fonte, during the trial, was suddenly asked to testify about an alleged threat against him that was made by Iveli, although no prior notification of this was given to the defense and there was no reference to it in the 3500 material which was supplied.

This certainly constituted a post-conspiratorial statement, since the petitioner could not have been in conspiracy with Fonte at the time because Fonte was already then cooperating with the Government.

Moreover, it seems amazing that there would have been no notification through 3500 material that a threat had been communicated and that nothing in the bail hearings was said about threats.

The virulence of this testimony is seen in the fact that the alleged main culprit, Salvatore Larca, was acquitted because no narcotics were ever found in his possession. Similarly, in the case of Iveli, despite elaborate surveillance, both visual and by wiretap, he was never found in possession of narcotics. Thus, the alleged threat which Iveli supposedly communicated to Fonte was most damaging because it tended to corroborate Fonte's allegations that Iveli was involved by means of self-serving and uncorroborated accusations about threats.

Iveli had never been in trouble with the law with the exception of a gambling arrest. He had no background whatsoever in drugs.

The circumstances of this case, therefore, will revolved around legal issues and sufficiency of evidence rather than matters affecting the credibility of witnesses as such.

Iveli sought to obtain the testimony of a co-defendant Salvatore Larca, but the latter refused to testify unless a severance was granted since he also had sought to obtain the testimony of Iveli (997-1005; 1097-1106).*

*Numerals in parentheses refer to pages of the official court reporter's minutes of trial, unless otherwise indicated.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

This Court has never directly passed upon the constitutionality of the federal wiretap statutes, 18 U.S.C. Sections 2510-2518. Petitioner submits that wiretapping violates the Fourth Amendment and should be declared unconstitutional. In any event, however, in the case at bar there was no proper showing of minimization of the electronic surveillance.

The petitioner was admittedly the subject of electronic surveillance conducted by New York Couty and other counties, and the Government produced a number of wiretap orders and affidavits supporting such orders, which resulted in extensive electronic surveillance, not only of Iveli, but of people allegedly involved in the conspiracy.

At 760 of the record, Judge Lasker declared that he would have to deny a minimization hearing "as to underlying warrants and tapes and taps . . . I have concluded that they do not have the right, they do not have the standing . . . ."

While on September 10, 1973, there was a brief hearing which included the question of minimization to a limited extent, there was no hearing with respect to the underlying orders, tapes and taps.

Michael Schnurr, who testified that he was attached to the New York City Police Department, stated that he conducted surveillances in connection with an investigation of this case. In this regard, Schnurr admitted

that all calls were intercepted and were listened to for at least a period of sixty seconds and that other calls were listened to in their entirety. Schnurr stated, however, that none of the calls received were determined to be non-pertinent, so all the calls, with the exception of two, were recorded.

In other words, of the 115 calls that were intercepted, only *two* were not recorded (83-86, Minutes of 9/10/73).

In retrospect, however, Schnurr conceded that some of the calls which were allegedly thought to be pertinent, were not deemed pertinent (85).

Finally, Schnurr conceded, in questioning by the Court, that actually he listened to every call that he had intercepted for as long as it lasted (85).

We submit, however, that the Court below, in *United States v. Bynum*, 475 F.2d 832 (2 Cir. 1973) and *United States v. Manfredi*, ____ F.2d____; Docket No. 72-2278, decided November 23, 1973, clearly indicated that where there is any possible evidence that electronic surveillance aggrieved a party directly or indirectly, that he is entitled to a minimization hearing. The rather cursory hearing permitted on September 19, 1973, was certainly insufficient.

We also call this Court's attention to the fact that in both *Manfredi* and *Bynum*, *supra*, implicit in the opinion of the Tribunal below, was the recognition that unless there was proper minimization, the use of electronic surveillance was fatal. This Court's dicta in *Gelbard v. United States* is consistent.

The obtaining of convictions have sometimes been exemplified by reprehensible and illegal methods. The Supreme Court has called this a pollution of the law and that the dignity of the United States Government will not permit convictions based upon such evidence (*Mesarosh v. United States*, 352 U.S. 1, 9, 14; *Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471; *Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States*, 251 U.S. 385).

In *Coolidge v. New Hampshire*, 403 U.S. 443, quoting with approval the language of *Boyd v. United States*, 116 U.S. 616 at 635, the Supreme Court warned against deviations that caused an erosion of constitutional and statutory rights. There the Supreme Court explained:

> "It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; *but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices, get their first footing in that way, namely by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.* This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions . . .should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it *consisted more in sound than in substance.* It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachment thereon." (Emphasis ours.)

In I Cooley, *Constitution Limitations*, (8th Ed.), Section 646, this famous author declares:

> "In this country, where officers are specially appointed or elected to represent the people in these prosecutions, their position gives them immense power for oppression; and it is to be feared that they do not always sufficiently appreciate the responsiblity, and wield the power with due regard to the legal rights and privileges of the accused. . . ."

In *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 and *Mapp v. Ohio*, 367 U.S. 643, the Supreme Court also indicated that the law must be obeyed and irrespective of whether or not the prisoner goes free, it is the law that must be obeyed and not the determination of the nature of the crime that must be inquired into.

In *Mapp v. Ohio*, for example, the Supreme Court declared (367 U.S. at 659):

> "The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the character of its own existence."

In *Lee v. Florida*, 392 U.S. 378, the Supreme Court of the United States noted that it had failed to find a single case where law enforcement officers had ever been prosecuted for blatantly violating the provisions forbidding improper wiretapping. The determination of the United States Supreme Court therefore was that the wiretaps must be kept out of evidence as a deterrent and that no prohibition and no sanction against the officers who

violated the spirit and letter of the law could be tolerated. Thus, the Court explained in *Lee v. Florida*:

> "But the decision we reached today is not based upon language and doctrinal symmetry alone. It is buttressed as well by the 'imperative of judicial integrity.'
>
> *Elkins v. United States* . . .Under our constitution *no court, state or federal, may serve as an accomplice* in the willful transgression of 'the laws of the United States,' laws by which 'the judges in every state are bound . . . .'
>
> Finally, our decision today is counseled by experience. The hope was expressed in *Schwartz v. Texas* that 'enforcement of the statutory prohibition in Sec. 605 can be achieved under the penal provisions' of the Communications Act, 344 U.S. at 201 . . . . That has proved to be a vain hope. Research has failed to uncover a single reported prosecution of a law enforcement officer for violation of Sec. 605 since the statute was enacted. We conclude, as we concluded in *Elkins* and in *Mapp*, that nothing short of mandatory exclusion of the illegal evidence will compel respect for the federal law 'in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.' *Elkins v. United States*, . . . reversed." (Emphasis ours.)

It is also to be noted that both the state and federal statutes require minimization. Certainly, as applied in a federal court, the minimization requirement is a prerequisite (18 U.S.C. Sections 2510-2518).

In *Berger v. New York*, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), the Supreme Court noted that the New York statute authorizing wiretapping was *prima facie* unconstitutional and, therefore, unless saved by compliance with new federal standards, the wiretaps here would necessarily be invalid. Without a hearing, however, it is impossible to determine whether or not proper minimization was in fact practiced. The mere articulation in the order that it should be practiced, does not mean that it in fact actually was.

In *Gelbard v. United States*, 408 U.S. 41, 46, 50 (1972) and *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347, the Supreme Court made it quite clear that strict standards would be applied to determine whether or not there was proper minimization or, for that matter, proper compliance with statutory prerequisites. (See, *United States v. Kahn*, ____U.S.___, 39 L.ed. 2d 225 at 234.)

When invading one's privacy, there is a *prima facie* assumption that the Fourth Amendment has been violated unless the Government can establish that they acted under a warrant that was not only obtained in accordance with law, but which was then executed in accordance with law, (*Coolidge v. New Hampshire*, 403 U.S. 443, and *Elkins v. United States*, 364 U.S. 206).

II.

The petitioner was prejudiced by the failure of the Trial Court to grant a severance so that he could use co-defendant Larca as a witness and also by virtue of the fact that the prosecution was permitted to adduce testimony from the witness Fonte about alleged threats when there was no prior notification given that a statement of the defendant was to be used in evidence despite a request therefore.

The petitioner herein was never found in possession of narcotics despite the elaborate and lengthy surveillances by electronic means and visual observations. He had no background in narcotics and, of course, it is the position of the prosecution that their cooperating witnesses were telling the truth.

On the other hand, the defense necessarily maintains that petitioner was innocent and that at no time was he involved in narcotics in any way since he was first, last and always, a gambler.

During the trial, Larca, one of the co-defendants who was acquitted, had sought to obtain the testimony of Iveli and Iveli sought to obtain the testimony of Larca, since it seemed obvious that they could be extremely helpful to each other. On the other hand, because of the fact that they were co-defendants being tried simultaneously, there was no way of compelling either to testify on the other's behalf. As a matter of fact, Iveli was actually called outside the presence of the jury, but stated that he refused to testify on the grounds of possible self-incrimination (1097-1106)

The Court should have granted the severance to one of the two at least, but this was not done. We maintain that Iveli was there by prejudice.

This was a case where accomplices were the prime witnesses against the petitioner. As such, their testimony had to be scrutinized very carefully. The testimony of accomplices, of course, is inherently suspect because they are naturally trying to salvage their own freedom. In each of the case, the accomplices had everything to gain and nothing to lose by virtue of testimony that was helpful to the Government.

In this context, some sort of corroboration was extremely important so far as the Government was concerned.

In the case of Larca, who was acquitted, the Government really had no corroboration other than the accomplice's testimony, and he was acquitted.

In the case of Iveli, however, there was corroboration of a self-serving nature introduced when the witness Frank Fonte suddenly announced that a threat had been communicated to him by Iveli. This was, of course, very dangerous and prejudicial testimony because it now not only tended to corroborate Fonte, but painted Iveli as someone to be feared, despite the fact that he had not yet taken the stand. Because of that testimony, the Court was told that petitioner would have to reevaluate whether or not he would take the stand.

The most troublesome aspect of this incident was that none of the 3500 material contained any reference to a threat, and apparently nothing was ever said about it at the bail hearings involving Iveli.

Fonte was extremely anxious to help the Government because his own future depended upon his value as a witness.

In *Gregory v. United States*, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the Court aptly condemned such tactics, referring to the case of *Krulewitch v. United States*, 336 U.S. 440 at 453. While the Court there was referring to police officers, the same may be addressed to the single prosecution witness of any substance in the case at bar. Thus, in the *Gregory* opinion the Court of Appeals observed:

> "...The volunteering of inadmissible testimony prejudicial to the defendant has been condemned time and again by both state and federal courts. For example, in *Wright v. State*, Okl. Cr. App. 325 P.2d 1089, 1093 (1958), where a law enforcement officer injected this type of prejudicial testimony, not twice as here, but only once, the court stated: 'This type of testimony has often been referred to as an 'evidential harpoon' that has been wilfully jabbed into the defendant and then jerked out by an admonition to the jury not to consider the same. This court has never condoned, but often criticized a witness being intoxicated with eagerness in an all out effort to obtain a conviction.... Officers must be aware that an overzealous attitude is, in most instances,

> detrimental to the prosecution and often results in a retrial of the case at considerable expense to the state.' "

The petitioner had previously requested any statements that would be used against him to be divulged in advance of trial. This was not done because the Government maintained that they did not know about it until almost the last minute (584; 602-605; 241).

The Government, however, had an obligation under *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, to notify Iveli immediately when it learned that testimony about a threat would be offered. It seems inconceivable that with all the interviews with this witness and his being held in protective custody, that nothing whatsoever would have come to the attention of the Government concerning a threat, until the midst of trial.

The Trial Court erred in permitting its use.

CONCLUSION

The petition for certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Irving Anolik
Attorney for Petitioner

EXHIBITS

ORDER OF UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse in the City of New York, on the twenty-second day of February one thousand nine hundred and seventy-four.

Present:

HON. J. EDWARD LUMBARD

HON. HENRY J. FRIENDLY

HON. WILLIAM H. TIMBERS

Circuit Judges,

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v. 73-2750

Filippo Ivelli, Salvatore Larca, Robert Mentrasti, a/k/a

Order of United States Court of Appeals

Robby, James Johnson, a/k/a Junior, John Boone, a/k/a J.B., Kenneth Saunders, a/k/a Leggs, Ernest Walters,

Defendants,

Filippo Ivelli,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is affirmed.

A. DANIEL FUSARO,
Clerk

VINCENT A. CARLIN,
Chief Deputy Clerk

ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. A-880

Filippo Iveli,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES

UPON CONSIDERATION of the application of counsel for petitioner,

IT IS ORDERED that the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the above-entitled cause be, and the same is hereby, extended to and including April 23, 1974.

s/ Thurgood Marshall

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States

Dated this 18th
day of March, 1974.

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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

No. 73-1578

FILIPPO IVELI, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

Petitioner contends (1) that 18 U.S.C. 2510 *et seq.* are unconstitutional, (2) that interceptions of conversations on his telephone were not properly minimized, (3) that he was denied a hearing to explore whether antecedent interceptions on the telephones of third parties were properly minimized, (4) that the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance, and (5) that he was prejudiced by the admission of allegedly improper testimony by a co-conspirator.

Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, petitioner was convicted of distributing and possessing with intent to distribute narcotic drugs, and conspiracy to do so, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846.[1] He was sentenced to three concurrent terms of two and one-half years' imprisonment and three years of special parole. The court of appeals affirmed without opinion (Pet. 16).

Prior to trial, the government made known its intention to offer recordings of conversations between petitioner and co-defendant Walters which had been intercepted during a sixty-day period of court authorized electronic surveillance of petitioner's home telephone. The warrants authorizing the interception of conversations over petitioner's phone were the last in a series of thirty-one eavesdropping warrants and renewal orders issued by various Justices of the Supreme Court of New York over a three-year period. The numerous warrants were interrelated in that the statements of probable cause in the applications for many warrants included transcripts of rele-

[1] Petitioner was acquitted on two other substantive counts of possession and distribution. Also charged in the indictment were co-defendants Salvatore Larca, Robert Mentrasti, James Johnson, John Boone, Kenneth Saunders and Ernest Walters. Mentrasti and Johnson pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count and testified at trial as government witnesses. Saunders and Walters were convicted of possessing and distributing heroin. All defendants, other than petitioner, were acquitted on the conspiracy count. Larca was also acquitted on the only other count in which he was named. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on six other counts.

vant conversations seized pursuant to the execution of earlier electronic surveillance warrants.

Petitioner and other defendants moved to suppress the conversations which had been intercepted over petitioner's telephone on the grounds that (1) the interception of innocent conversations on petitioner's phone had not been properly minimized and (2) the original warrant authorizing such interceptions was founded on a statement of probable cause which was tainted by the inclusion of material derived from antecedent wiretaps, which petitioner alleged to have been improperly executed. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that the interceptions on petitioner's telephone had been properly minimized and subsequently ruled that petitioner did not have standing to raise the minimization issue as to the antecedent wiretaps which were not directed against him (Tr. 760).

1. Petitioner contends, without supporting argument, that 18 U.S.C. 2510 *et seq.* are unconstitutional because "wiretapping violates the Fourth Amendment." This claim is insubstantial. Wiretapping is not unconstitutional *per se*, and lower courts have uniformly held that the challenged sections are constitutional. *United States* v. *Tortorello*, 480 F.2d 764 (C.A. 2), certiorari denied, 414 U.S. 866; *United States* v. *Bobo*, 477 F.2d 974 (C.A. 4), petition for certiorari pending *sub nom. Gray* v. *United States*, No. 73-231; *United States* v. *Whitaker*, 474 F.2d 1246 (C.A. 3), certiorari denied, 412 U.S. 953; *United States* v. *Cox*, 462 F.2d 1293 (C.A. 8), cer-

tiorari denied, May 28, 1974, No. 72-5278; *United States* v. *Cox*, 449 F.2d 679 (C.A. 10), certiorari denied, 406 U.S. 934.

2. Petitioner's contention that the government failed to minimize properly the interception of innocent conversations over his telephone is also without merit. At the minimization hearing, the government offered the testimony of police officers Geberth and Schnurr, who participated in the electronic surveillance of petitioner's telephone.[2] Both officers testified that they were instructed to intercept and record only conversations that were deemed pertinent to the scope of the warrants. To that end, they were to intercept initially and record each conversation until a determination could be made of its character. If the call was deemed non-pertinent, recording and monitoring was to cease, except on a "spot-check" basis. Monitoring officers were directed not to monitor any "privileged" conversations (H. Tr., Vol. 2, pp. 5-6, 62).

Evidence at the hearing established that during the sixty days of surveillance of petitioner's telephone, 115 calls were intercepted. Petitioner was a party to all of the calls. Of these, the only calls which were not fully monitored and recorded were two

---

[2] It was stipulated and agreed by all parties that the testimony of two other police officers whom the government intended to call to testify would be substantially the same as that of Officers Geberth and Schnurr (H. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 83). ("H. Tr." refers to the three-volume transcript of the September 10, 1973 hearing.)

calls between petitioner and an attorney, in which the interception ceased as soon as the monitoring agents realized the nature of the call (H. Tr., Vol. 2, pp. 7, 27). The remaining 113 conversations were monitored and recorded in their entirety. Sixty-four of these conversations lasted less than one minute (H. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 68).[3] The remaining 49 conversations were deemed pertinent at the time they were intercepted (H. Tr., Vol. 2, pp. 45, 85). Though the nature or subject of some of the calls was not apparent, they were deemed pertinent because of the guarded nature of the conversations, and the employment of code words frequently associated with the narcotics trade (H. Tr., Vol. 2, pp. 46, 72).

In light of this evidence and petitioner's failure to produce any evidence to contradict the government's showing of compliance with 18 U.S.C. 2518(5), the trial court correctly concluded that the monitoring agents properly minimized the interception of innocent conversations on petitioner's telephone. See *United States* v. *Manfredi*, 488 F.2d 588 (C.A. 2), certiorari denied, June 3, 1974, No. 73-1364.

3. Petitioner argues that he was improperly denied a hearing at which he could explore whether probable cause for the warrant authorizing the wiretap on his telephone was based on antecedent interception of the conversations of other persons, which, petitioner argues, may not have been properly mini-

[3] The remaining calls average only 3 to 4 minutes, since all 115 conversations consumed less than 203 minutes (H. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 67).

mized. During the execution of 28 prior wiretaps on the telephones of persons other than petitioner, the record discloses only one conversation to which petitioner was a party. That conversation between petitioner and one George Bove was intercepted pursuant to a court authorized wiretap on the latter's phone. The seventeen-line transcript of that conversation was included in the 23-page affidavit of Detective Anthony Gustitus in support of the application for a warrant for surveillance on petitioner's phone. Petitioner requested the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Bove wiretap and apparently the other wiretaps had been properly minimized. The court denied the motion on the ground that petitioner lacked standing to raise the minimization issue with respect to taps on the telephones of third parties (Tr. 760).

As to the wiretaps in which petitioner was neither "a person against whom the interception was directed," or "a party to" any intercepted conversations, he clearly lacked standing to raise the minimization issue. See 18 U.S.C. 2510(11) and 18 U.S.C. 2518(10)(a). As to the one wiretap where petitioner was intercepted, there is recent authority to indicate that he did have "standing" to raise the issue of minimization as to that wiretap. See *United States* v. *Scott*, No. 71-1702, decided June 27, 1974 (C.A.D.C.). Even assuming, however, that the trial court erroneously denied petitioner standing, and assuming that petitioner could have shown that the Bove wiretap had been improperly minimized, peti-

tioner could not have obtained suppression of all the challenged material. At most petitioner would have been entitled to the suppression of the one conversation cited in the affidavit establishing probable cause for the issuance of the warrant authorizing interceptions on his telephone. *United States* v. *Scott*, *supra*, slip op. at 6, n. 5. It is clear, however, that there was ample independent evidence supporting the warrant authorizing the tap on petitioner's telephone. Detective Gustitus' lengthy affidavit disclosed an overwhelming basis for believing that petitioner was a major narcotics dealer apart from the brief and cryptic conversation between petitioner and Bove. Conversations between petitioner's confederates Miritello and Bove indicated that he supplied both of them with narcotics and that he had recently reduced his prices (Gustitus Affidavit, pp. 3-11). Physical surveillance of petitioner had disclosed his participation in two apparent narcotics transactions (*id.* at 16-19), and a previously reliable informant stated that he had personally discussed major narcotics transactions with petitioner by telephone (*id.* at 19-21). Thus, regardless of the inclusion of the hypothetically tainted conversation in the application for the warrant, the wiretap on petitioner's phone was properly authorized. See *United States* v. *Garcilaso de la Vega*, 489 F. 2d 761 (C.A. 2); *United States* v. *Friedland*, 441 F. 2d 855, 860 (C.A. 2), certiorari denied, 404 U.S. 867. *United States* v. *Scott*, *supra*, slip op. at 3, n. 2.

4. Prior to trial, both petitioner and co-defendant

Larca moved for severance on the grounds that each might wish to call the other as a witness at trial. The motion was denied as premature. Thereafter, the motion to sever was renewed during trial and in a brief hearing outside the presence of the jury both petitioner and Larca stated that if called as witnesses they would invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination (Tr. 1103-1106). The motion for severance was again denied. Petitioner argues that he was prejudiced by the action of the trial court in denying his motion. Petitioner fails to show how he was prejudiced, other than by stating that Larca's testimony "could be extremely helpful" (Pet. 12), and there is nothing to indicate that Larca would have been willing to testify at a separate trial. To require severance on such an insubstantial basis would effectively preclude joint trials of co-defendants, and the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying petitioner's motion. *United States* v. *Wyler*, 487 F.2d 170, 173 (C.A. 2); *United States* v. *Somers*, 496 F.2d 723 (C.A. 3).

5. Near the completion of the direct testimony of Frank Fonte, an unindicted co-conspirator who cooperated in the investigation and testified at trial, government counsel stated that Fonte was prepared to testify as to threats made by petitioner after his arrest and release on bail (Tr. 241-243).[4] Petitioner

[4] According to Fonte, petitioner told him that he was praying for Fonte's life, because "his man" wanted to get rid of him (Tr. 584).

objected to the proferred testimony on the grounds of surprise, and the court eventually ruled that the testimony would not be admitted (Tr. 246, 262).

On cross-examination, defense counsel inquired extensively into such matters as whether Fonte was "scared" of the agents (Tr. 305-306), whether he was getting paid by the government while he was in "hiding" (Tr. 407-408), and how often he saw the agents after his release. The court then ruled that the testimony concerning the threats was admissible on redirect examination (Tr. 576).

A careful reading of the challenged testimony in the context of all the evidence makes clear that the threat was really made by defendant Larca and that at worst petitioner was merely passing it along for "his man" (Tr. 571, 584). In view of Larca's acquittal on all counts, petitioner's characterization of the threat as "very dangerous and prejudicial testimony" (Pet. 13) is not persuasive. In any event, "evidence of conduct designed to impede or prevent a witness from testifying is admissible as showing consciousness of guilt." *United States* v. *Alberti*, 470 F.2d 878, 882 (C.A. 2); *United States* v. *Cirillo*, 468 F.2d 1233, 1240 (C.A. 2), certiorari denied, 410 U.S. 989.[5]

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[5] Petitioner's argument that the government was obligated by *Brady* v. *Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 to reveal the threat in advance of trial is misplaced. Evidence of threats to potential government witnesses is not exculpatory within the meaning of *Brady*.

It is therefore respectfully submitted that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

ROBERT H. BORK,
Solicitor General.

SEPTEMBER 1974.

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